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Abstract 
We present new data on effective corporate income tax rates in 85 countries in 
2004.   The data come from a survey, conducted jointly with PricewaterhouseCoopers, of 
all taxes imposed on “the same” standardized mid-size domestic firm.  In a cross-section 
of countries, our estimates of the effective corporate tax rate have a large adverse impact 
on aggregate investment, FDI, and entrepreneurial activity. Corporate tax rates are 
correlated with investment in manufacturing but not services, as well as with the size of 
the informal economy.  The results are robust to the inclusion of many controls.  
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  1The effect of corporate taxes on investment and entrepreneurship is one of the 
central questions in both public finance and development.  This effect matters not only 
for the evaluation and design of tax policy, but also for thinking about economic growth 
(see Robert J. Barro 1991, J. Bradford DeLong and Lawrence H. Summers 1991, and 
William J. Baumol, Robert E. Litan, and Carl J. Schramm 2007).  
Starting with Dale W. Jorgenson (1963) and Robert E. Hall and Jorgenson (1967), 
many public finance economists have addressed this topic.  A small selection of 
important studies includes Summers (1981), Martin Feldstein, Louis Dicks-Mireaux, and 
James Poterba (1983), Alan J. Auerbach (1983), Mervyn A. King and Don Fullerton 
(1984), Joel Slemrod (1990), Auerbach and Kevin A. Hassett (1992), James R. Hines Jr. 
and Eric M. Rice (1994), Jason G. Cummins, Hassett, and R. Glenn Hubbard (1996), 
Michael P. Devereux, Rachael Griffith, and Alexander Klemm (2002), and Mihir A. 
Desai, C. Fritz Foley, and Hines (2004b).   Auerbach (2002), Roger H. Gordon and Hines 
(2002), Hasset and Hubbard (2002), and Hines (2007) survey aspects of this literature.  
Generally speaking, this research finds adverse effects of corporate income taxes on 
investment, although studies offer different estimates of magnitudes.   
In this paper, we present new cross-country evidence on the effects of corporate 
taxes on investment and entrepreneurship.  The evidence comes from a newly constructed 
data base of corporate income tax rates for 85 countries in 2004.  We seek to contribute to 
the literature in four ways.   
First, we use new data for a large cross-section of countries.  Most cross-country 
studies focus on either some or all of the OECD countries (see especially King and 
Fullerton 1984, Devereux, Griffith, and Klemm 2002 and Devereux and Griffith 2003), 
  2and hence do not provide much information about the developing world.   Hassett and 
Aparna Mathur (2006) use a large data set of tax rates for 72 countries over 22 years to 
investigate the effects of taxes, including corporate taxes, on wages rather than 
investment.  Their data come from the AEI International Tax Database, which relies on 
summaries of tax rates produced by accounting firms, including PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
as well as the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation
1.  Hassett and Mathur have 
time series data, which we do not.  On the other hand, we have more complete 
information on depreciation and the treatment of labor taxes in the calculation of 
corporate tax rates
2.     
Second, we construct a new database of corporate (and other) tax rates that are 
comparable across countries. Our data, assembled jointly by the World Bank, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, and Harvard University, come from a computation of all 
relevant taxes applicable to the same standardized domestic enterprise, called 
TaxpayerCo, operating in each country.   In many instances, these rates differ sharply 
from statutory corporate tax rates.  Our methodology may provide a different perspective 
on corporate tax rates than data from the statutes, although it is limited by the typicality 
of case facts.  A related limitation of this study is that we do no have data on taxes paid 
by the owners of firms, and so cannot make a theoretically correct calculation integrating 
personal and corporate taxation (see, e.g., Auerbach 1979 and John R. Graham 2003).   
Third, in addition to standard data on aggregate investment and foreign direct 
investment (FDI), we put together new data on entrepreneurship.  These data come from 
                                                 
1 PwC has previously published tax rates for multiple countries, which have been used by Hassett and 
Mathur and others. Their rates have also been published by the World Bank’s Doing Business reports. 
These reports cover more countries than we do, but do not contain as detailed information as we use.  
2 The correlation between the rates we compute and the Hassett-Mathur rates is only about 0.5. We return 
to their measures later in the paper.   
  3the World Bank Entrepreneurship Survey, which seeks to produce comparable business 
registration data for a large number of countries.  We use this survey to construct 
measures of business density and formal entry.  These measures aggregate the creation of 
new formal firms with the transition of informal firms into formality, and as such both 
omit some entrepreneurial activity (the creation of informal firms, entrepreneurship 
inside existing firms) and include some purely administrative activity (registration of 
existing informal firms).  We interpret the evidence recognizing these limitations.    
Fourth, as pointed out by Steven J. Davis and Magnus Henrekson (2005), 
corporate income taxes might differentially affect investment in different sectors, as well 
as influence the allocation of resources between the formal and the informal sectors.  To 
address these issues, we use the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys to construct separate 
machinery investment measures for manufacturing and services.  We also use the Global 
Competitiveness Report estimates of the size of the informal sector.  We then assess the 
impact of corporate taxes on investment in manufacturing and services separately, as well 
as on the size of the informal economy.   
Research in public finance has developed elaborate constructs of corporate tax 
rates that are relevant to particular investment decisions.  In some instances, statutory 
rates measure the correct marginal tax rates.  Hall and Jorgenson (1967) started an 
extensive literature on how to compute the economically correct marginal tax rates using 
assessments of the profitability of future projects.  But average rates might also be 
relevant for investment decisions if firms are credit constrained or if they make discrete 
investment choices (Devereux and Griffith 2003).  In this paper, we remain agnostic as to 
which is the correct rate, and present a variety of measures and their effect on investment.  
  4The principal corporate income tax measure we use is the effective tax rate that 
TaxpayerCo pays if it complies with its country’s laws, defined as the actual corporate 
income tax owed by the company relative to pre-tax profits.  Unlike much of the 
literature, we can actually compute that rate under our case facts.  Since TaxpayerCo is a 
new company, we compute both the 1
st year effective tax rate, and the 5-year tax rate 
taking account of the present value of depreciation and other deductions.  Our data reveal 
a consistent and large adverse effect of corporate taxes on both investment and 
entrepreneurship.  A 10 percentage point increase in the 1
st year effective corporate tax 
rate reduces the aggregate investment to GDP ratio by about 2 percentage points (mean is 
21 percent), and the official entry rate by 1.4 percentage points (mean is 8 percent).   
To check the robustness of our results, we consider several additional potential 
determinants of investment and entrepreneurship.  These include other taxes, including 
additional taxes imposed on the firm as well as the VAT and the personal income tax, 
measures of the cost of tax compliance, estimates of tax evasion, security of property 
rights, economic development, regulation, trade openness, inflation, and seignorage.   
Some of these factors affect some measures of investment and entrepreneurship, but they 
do not eliminate the large adverse effect of corporate taxes.   
Finally, our data enable us to ask, in a cross-country context, whether corporate 
taxes encourage debt as opposed to equity finance (see Franco Modigliani and Merton H. 
Miller 1958, Auerbach 1979, Miller 1977, Graham 1996, Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason 
1990, Desai, Foley, and Hines 2004a).  We find a large and significant positive 
association between the effective corporate tax rate and the aggregate debt to equity ratio.   
  5The next section of the paper describes our data.  Section II presents summary 
statistics.   Section III presents the basic results on corporate taxation, investment, and 
entrepreneurship.  Section IV concludes.   
 
I. Data 
We collect our data from PricewaterhouseCoopers accountants and tax lawyers.  
We describe a standardized business and ask them essentially to fill out its tax return, as 
well as to provide supporting information and relevant tax schedules.  Two rounds of this 
exercise were conducted, in January 2005 and 2006.  This paper uses data covering the 
tax system effective in fiscal year 2004
3.   
The sample consists of 85 countries covered by Simeon Djankov et al. (2002).  It 
includes 27 high income, 19 upper-middle income, 21 lower-middle income, and 18 low 
income countries.  In addition to 22 rich OECD countries, 10 are in East Asia, 17 are in 
Eastern Europe, 13 in Latin America, 6 in the Middle East, 14 in Africa, and 3 in South 
Asia. 
The data are constructed using a standardized case study of a business called 
“TaxpayerCo.”  TaxpayerCo is a taxable corporation operating in the most populous city 
in the country.  It is liable for taxes charged at the local, state/provincial, and national 
levels.  It is 100 percent domestically and privately owned and has 5 owners, none of 
whom is a legal entity.  TaxpayerCo performs general industrial/commercial activities:  it 
produces ceramic flower pots and sells them at retail.  It does not engage in foreign trade 
                                                 
3 The survey presents respondents with financial statements for calendar year 2004. We always consider the 
data for calendar year 2004, even when fiscal year is different from calendar year.   
  6or handle products subject to a special tax regime.  Ceramic pots were chosen because 
they are made in every country, and face no industry-specific tax regime.  
TaxpayerCo employs 60 people:  4 managers, 8 assistants and 48 workers
4.  All 
are nationals and were hired on January 1
st.  One of the managers is also an owner.  
Employees of the same hierarchical status earn the same wage. All employees are 
younger than 40 years and all workers are younger than 26 years. All employees worked 
and earned the same salary the year before and none of the employees is disabled. 
Managers became subject to social security taxes prior to 1993 while assistants and 
workers only became subject to social security taxes after 1993. 
The corporation started operations on January 1
st 2004.  On the same date, it 
bought all the assets.  It owns one plot of land, a building, machinery, one truck, 10 
computers and other office equipment.  The building is used for production, storage and 
offices.  It has 10,000 square feet of floor space on a 6,000 square foot land plot.  The 
machinery is classified as light machinery for tax purposes.  The value of computer assets 
is equally divided between hardware and software.  Other office equipment is composed 
of standard office tables, chairs, one copier, one fax machine, one scanner and 10 phones. 
We created TaxpayerCo’s financial statements as if TaxpayerCo were operating 
in a tax free world.  All variables in these financial statements were simple multiples of 
the country’s income per capita in local currency (from the World Bank).  The statements 
as well as the case of the U.S. using the actual values are presented in Table 1.  Panel A 
describes the balance sheet, and Panel B the profit and loss statement.  The multiples 
were chosen to be typical for a mid-size manufacturing firm.  We specified that 
                                                 
4 Sixty employees is a somewhat arbitrary number for a mid-size firm, which was chosen because it is the 
world-wide average employment in firms in the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey.  
  7TaxpayerCo keeps 50 percent of after-tax profits as retained earnings and distributes the 
other 50 percent as dividends.  In a tax-free world, retained earnings are then half of pre-
tax earnings (equal to 79 times GNI per capita per Table 1), or 39.5 times GNI per capita.  
However, the actual amount of retained earnings is a function of the tax system and, 
therefore, is not included in the pre-tax Table 1.  
We sent these statements to the PricewaterhouseCoopers office in Washington, 
D.C., from which they were distributed to the country offices.  One response was 
prepared per country.   PwC respondents in each country calculated the taxes that 
TaxpayerCo must pay in its first year of operation.  Respondents also provided the full 
tax schedules for corporate income taxes
5, labor taxes
6 for which the statutory incidence 
is on the employer, property tax, asset and capital tax, turnover tax, business license tax, 
financial transactions tax, but also VAT and sales taxes.  Respondents further described 
all applicable deductions and exemptions.  They informed us of the full depreciation 
schedules for all assets, so we could compute depreciation allowances for TaxpayerCo.  
Respondents also recorded the deductibility of advertising expenses, machinery repair 
expenses, interest expenses, and of each applicable tax.  Taxes at all levels of government 
                                                 
5 All taxes levied on corporate income are considered corporate income taxes for the purposes of this 
analysis, regardless of the name given to them. 
6 All charges levied on labor for which the statutory incidence is on the employer are considered labor 
taxes, whether they are called labor taxes, social security contributions, or something else, whether they are 
requited or unrequited, and whether they are paid to a public or private agency. We try to unbundle the 
mandatory accident insurance contribution from the labor taxes. Wherever we can obtain information on 
the contribution rate for the mandatory accident insurance contribution, we do not include it in the labor 
taxes to be consistent across countries. Many countries only mandate that employers have an accident-at-
work insurance in place for their employees, but we could not find rates applicable to TaxpayerCo. 
  8were included.  Our analysis focuses on corporate income taxes, although we use the 
additional tax and compliance cost data provided by PwC for robustness checks
7.   
For each tax, PwC respondents described the frequency and the process for 
payment, e.g., whether the tax could be paid electronically or required payment in person.  
The time it took to prepare, file and pay TaxpayerCo’s taxes was also recorded. 
All data thus collected was subsequently discussed and checked with PwC 
personnel in the sample countries
8.  The data was also double-checked with information 
provided by the International Bureau for Fiscal Documentation.  Discrepancies were then 
addressed through further discussions with PwC country offices.    
 
A. Tax variables 
Table 2 describes the main variables.  We start with the tax variables, and divide 
their presentation into three groups: corporate income tax measures, other tax measures, 
and tax administration measures.  We compute three corporate income tax rate variables: 
the first is the traditional statutory corporate income tax rate, while the remaining two are 
based on the actual taxes owed by TaxpayerCo as computed from survey responses.  Web 
Appendix A presents the values of tax variables for all of the sample countries.  
1. Statutory corporate tax rate.  This is the tax rate a corporation has to pay on 
marginal income assuming that it is in the highest tax bracket, taking into account federal, 
state, and local rates.  We account for the deductibility of some taxes for the purposes of 
                                                 
7 We do not have enough information to integrate personal income and dividend taxes with corporate 
income taxes.  We do not consider minor taxes, such as waste collection and vehicle taxes. Taxes on real 
estate transactions and capital gains taxes are not included because they do not come up in the case facts. 
8 Data for the Kyrgyz Republic and Mongolia were provided by PwC’s Kazakhstan office.  
  9calculating the tax base.  In Switzerland and the U.S., for example, state income taxes are 
deducted from the federal income tax base
9. 
2.  1
st year effective corporate tax rate.  This is the actual first year corporate 
income tax liability of TaxpayerCo relative to pre-tax earnings (79 times GNI per capita 
per Table 1), taking account of all available deductions.  The Appendix illustrates the 
exact steps used in the calculation of this tax variable, and the next, for Argentina.       
3.  5-year effective corporate tax rate.  This rate takes account of actual 
depreciation schedules going 5 years forward.  The numerator is the present value of 
actual corporate tax liabilities of TaxpayerCo over 5 years, where only depreciation 
deductions change over time.  The denominator is the present value of pre-tax earnings, 
assumed to be the same every year.  We discount both taxes and profits at 8 percent
10. 
The effective corporate tax rate, both in its 1
st year and 5-year versions, does not 
fully reflect all the complexities that public finance theory suggests are relevant to 
corporate decision-making (see, e.g., King and Fullerton 1984).  Our measures have the 
advantage of extreme simplicity and transparency, and may plausibly correspond to what 
profit-maximizing entrepreneurs look at when they evaluate investments.  We present the 
basic ingredients of the computation of corporate taxes for a large number of countries, to 
see whether, in their simplest form, they influence investment and entrepreneurship.     
                                                 
9 It is possible that TaxpayerCo faces a lower marginal tax rate than the one in the highest bracket. We 
computed the marginal corporate income tax rate applicable to TaxpayerCo. Worldwide, it is 1.5 
percentage points lower on average than the statutory rate, but across countries is very highly correlated 
with the statutory rate.  We have run our regressions using the marginal rate applicable to TaxpayerCo, and 
they are generally weaker than those for other rates. A plausible interpretation of this is that it is the 
statutory rate that is relevant for aggregate investment, which is what we use as the dependent variable. We 
therefore do not discuss the marginal rate applicable to TaxpayerCo any further in the paper.   
10 In our main calculation of the 5-year effective tax rate, we do not take inflation into account. However, in 
our robustness checks, we both control for inflation and consider the effect of non-indexation of 
depreciation deductions, emphasized by Auerbach and Jorgenson (1980).  
  10In addition to the corporate taxes, we use four other tax rates in our analysis, the 
first three of which come from our survey, and the last from other PwC data: 
4. Labor tax.  This is the sum of all labor-related taxes payable by TaxpayerCo, 
including payroll taxes, mandatory social security contributions, mandatory health 
insurance, mandatory unemployment insurance, and any local contributions that depend 
on the payroll or number of employees.  The denominator is pre-tax earnings of 
TaxpayerCo.  Only taxes with statutory incidence on the employer are included.  We use 
the first year of operations.  We do not have data on taxes paid by individuals, even if 
they are withheld by TaxpayerCo. 
5.  Other taxes.  This is the sum of all taxes payable by TaxpayerCo in the first 
year of operation that enter the profit and loss statement where the statutory incidence is 
on the firm, other than corporate income and labor tax.  It is the sum of all property taxes, 
business license taxes, financial transactions and asset and capital taxes payable by 
TaxpayerCo.  The denominator is pre-tax earnings of TaxpayerCo. 
6.  VAT and Sales Tax.  This is the sum of all consumption tax rates for taxes 
payable or collected by TaxpayerCo, including the value added tax, the sales tax, the 
turnover tax, and any related surtaxes.  82 of the 85 countries in our sample have VAT.  
For countries that have multiple VAT rates, we use the rate applicable to TaxpayerCo, 
i.e., to ceramic goods.  Only 5 countries in our sample have a sales tax collected by 
TaxpayerCo, and that is what we use.    
7.  Personal Income Tax.  This is the highest bracket marginal personal income 
tax rate in 2004.   We only include the tax at the national level.   This tax rate, obtained 
from PwC and other sources, is used as a control; it does not come from the main survey. 
  11In addition to these seven tax rates, we use two measures of the burden of tax 
administration.  The first is the number of tax payments made by TaxpayerCo in a fiscal 
year.  The tax payments indicator reflects the actual number of taxes paid, the method of 
payment, the frequency of payment, and the number of agencies involved for 
TaxpayerCo during the second year of operation. It covers payments made by the 
company on consumption taxes, such as sales tax or value added tax (which are 
traditionally withheld on behalf of the consumer), as well as profit, labor, property and 
other tax payments. Where full electronic filing is allowed, the tax is counted as paid 
once a year even if the payment is more frequent.  In Hong Kong, TaxpayerCo pays 4 
times per year; in Mali, it pays 60 times per year. 
The second measure of tax administration is the time to comply, recorded in hours 
per year.  The indicator measures the time to prepare, file and pay (or withhold) three 
major types of taxes: the corporate income tax, value added or sales tax, and labor taxes, 
including payroll taxes and social security contributions.  Preparation time includes the 
time to collect all information necessary to compute the tax payable.  If separate 
accounting books must be kept — or separate calculations must be made — for tax 
purposes, the time associated with these activities is included.  Filing time includes the 
time to complete all necessary tax forms and make all necessary calculations. Payment 
time is the hours needed to make the payment online or at the tax office.  When taxes are 
paid in person, the time includes delays while waiting.  In Armenia, it takes TaxpayerCo 
1120 hours per year to fulfill all tax requirements; in Ireland, it takes 76 hours per year. 
 
 
  12B. Outcome Variables  
We primarily analyze the effect of corporate taxes on aggregate investment and 
entrepreneurship.  We use two measures of investment: gross fixed capital formation and 
Foreign Direct Investment, both as a percentage of GDP, from the World Bank 
Development Indicators.  Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is the net inflows of 
investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) 
in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor.  Although 
foreign firms in some countries receive tax holidays, those tend to be relatively short 
term, and the rates that apply to domestic firms are probably correlated with those on 
foreign ones.  We use the average of the two investment to GDP ratios over 2003-2005
11.      
We also examine two measures of entrepreneurship: the number of business 
establishments and the rate of new business registration.  These data are collected by the 
World Bank’s Entrepreneurship Survey from national business registries whenever 
possible, and other sources when not.  For each country, the Survey measures the existing 
stock and the registration rate of limited liability corporations (or their equivalent in other 
legal systems).  The total number of registered firms is available for more countries than 
the entry rate.  The Survey seeks to assure comparability across countries, as well as to 
avoid shell corporations with no employees established for tax purposes.  The data cover 
the period from 2000 to 2004.  The business density measure is defined as the number of 
registered limited liability corporations per 100 members of the working-age population 
as of 2004; business registration (“entry”) is defined as the average 2000-2004 ratio of 
registrations over the number of limited liability corporations. 
                                                 
11 Ireland is a strong outlier in the data. If we replace the World Bank value for Ireland with the OECD 
value, our results only become stronger.   
  13The Entrepreneurship Survey does not cover sole proprietorships. For example, 
there are 7.2 million registered businesses in the United States that employ at least one 
worker.  Another 15.1 million businesses do not employ a single worker other than the 
owner.  The latter are not included in the density measure.   In many sample countries, 
such businesses are not required to register with the company registrar, making it 
impossible to collect comparable data.  They also usually face a different tax regime.  
The fact that we use aggregate measures of investment and entrepreneurship leads 
to two conceptual problems.  First, the rates we compute might be different from those 
faced by firms undertaking the bulk of aggregate investment (which are surely older and 
larger).  Presumably, if the tax rates facing the largest firms were uncorrelated with those 
we compute, we would find nothing in our data.   
Second, many entrepreneurial firms might be smaller than TaxpayerCo, and not 
even organized as corporations, which would again point to a mismatch between our tax 
and entrepreneurship variables (see for example Austan Goolsbee 1998).  We have gone 
back and checked whether the tax measures we compute apply to other legal forms.  Here 
we summarize what we have found; see Web Appendix B for details.  For 50 of the 85 
countries in the sample, we could confirm that the answer is yes.  We have verified that 
our results on the effects of taxes hold in this sub-sample, and are similar to those for the 
whole sample.  For another 19 countries, tax treatment of TaxpayerCo might differ 
depending on its legal status.  We do not have the ability to make tax computations for 
alternative organizational forms for these 19 countries.  Our results for these 19 countries 
only hold for FDI, which is indeed concentrated in the corporate sector.  Finally, for 16 
countries, we could not verify whether the same tax rules apply to other legal forms, but 
  14our basic results actually hold for that sub-sample, especially for the effective tax rates.  
It is best to interpret our evidence, then, as applying to investment and entrepreneurship 
by limited liability corporations.  
In addition to looking at the aggregate measures of investment and 
entrepreneurship, we consider the effects of corporate taxes on investment in 
manufacturing and services separately.    Corporate taxes might reduce investment in 
manufacturing because most manufacturing firms operate in the formal sector, but shift 
activity from the formal to the informal sector in services, where informality is more 
prevalent (Davis and Henrekson 2005).  It turns out that sectoral investment data are 
difficult to obtain for most countries
12.  Accordingly, we built up limited manufacturing 
and services investment variables from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys, which 
survey formal firms with more than 5 employees in many countries. 
To construct the investment numbers (for manufacturing and services in each 
country separately), we compute the median over all the firms with available data of 
“Purchases of New Machinery and Equipment” as a percentage of the establishment’s 
“Total Sales.”   This is a much narrower measure than aggregate investment, since it does 
not include other kinds of private investment or public investment.  We use the median 
because there are many outliers in these data
13.  We have been able to construct these 
sectoral investment numbers for 32 countries for manufacturing and 20 for services.   
In addition, we use an estimate of the size of the informal sector as a percentage 
of the total economy from the Global Competitiveness Report for 2005-2006 and 2006-
2007.   Several additional measures of the informal economy are available.  A prominent 
                                                 
12 There is some data from the United Nations, but we had difficulty making sense of the numbers.  
13 Similar results obtain if we eliminate observations above the 90
th and below the 10
th percentile and take 
the mean. 
  15estimate is Friedrich Schneider’s (2005), but it is computed using the ratio of tax 
collections to GDP.  One can also construct estimates using Enterprise Surveys (Rafael 
La Porta and Andrei Shleifer 2008), but these are based on tax evasion.  The advantage of 
the Global Competitiveness Report estimates is that they are not directly influenced by 
tax variables.   
Finally, we use the average debt to equity ratio from the IMF.  The IMF uses 
international financial databases of publicly traded companies to compute these averages 
from these national samples of traded firms.  
 
C. Control Variables    
  We are principally interested in the effects of our four measures of corporate 
income tax on investment and entrepreneurship.  Since we estimate simple cross-country 
regressions, there is always a risk that the correlations we document are spurious.  To 
partially address this risk, we control for many factors in the regressions.  These include 
the additional tax and tax compliance variables described above, but also other variables.  
We define those in Table 2, but summarize the economic issues here.  
First, since our sample is dominated by developing countries, tax enforcement 
might be an important factor influencing investment.  We use an estimate of the 
magnitude of tax evasion from the 2001-2002 Global Competitiveness Report.  This 
measure is available for 64 countries, and is constructed independently of the tax rates.  
Second, one might worry that the overall quality of institutions affects investment and 
entrepreneurship.  To address this concern, we control in the robustness checks for lagged 
per capita income and the property rights index from the Heritage Foundation.  Third, 
  16recent research suggests that government regulations, such as those of entry (Djankov et 
al. 2002) and labor markets (Juan Botero et al. 2004), affect investment and 
entrepreneurship
14.  We check the robustness of our results to the inclusion of these 
variables.     Fourth, theory predicts that inflation might influence investment, partly 
through its impact on the cost of capital (Auerbach and Jorgenson 1980), and partly 
because the government might use seignorage as a substitute for taxes.  To get at these 
issues, we control for the average 10-year inflation as a measure of long-run inflation, as 
well as for seignorage as a share of GDP.   Finally, a country’s openness to trade may 
influence investment and FDI; we check if it does.   
 
II. A look at the data  
  Table 3 presents the means of tax, tax administration, investment, 
entrepreneurship, and other outcome variables by income group.  Several interesting 
findings emerge from these data.  First, the world-wide average statutory corporate tax 
rate is about 29 percent, and does not vary much across income groups.  Nonetheless, 
there is large variation among countries.  The statutory rate is 12.5 percent for Ireland, 15 
percent for Latvia, Lithuania, and Lebanon, and over 40 percent for Pakistan, Japan, and 
the United States.    
Second, in our sample, the world average 1
st year effective corporate tax rate, at 
17.5 percent, is 11.5 percent lower than the average statutory tax rate.  Upper middle 
income countries have lower 1
st year effective rates than other groups, but otherwise 
                                                 
14 Examples of studies examining the effects of these measures of regulation on unemployment, labor 
reallocation, investment, and firm entry include Alberto Alesina et al. 2005, John Haltiwanger, Stefano 
Scarpetta, and Helena Schweiger 2008, Leora Klapper, Luc Laeven, and Raghuram Rajan 2006, and 
Antonio Ciccone and Elias Papaioannou 2007.  
  17variation across income groups is small.  Again, there is significant variation among 
countries.  In the first year of operation, TaxpayerCo faces zero effective corporate tax 
rate in Hong Kong and Mongolia, but 31 percent in Pakistan and nearly 40 percent in 
Bolivia.    
Third, the 5-year effective corporate tax rate is only about 2 percentage points 
higher than the first year one, on average, with similar patterns across income groups.  
We no longer have zero rates, but Mongolia has 6.6 percent and Lithuania 7.3 percent.     
   Our data are probably least appropriate for measuring the labor tax, since we have 
data on taxes paid by firms but not by individuals.  At the corporate level, the world-wide 
labor tax is around 15 percent, with low income countries having somewhat lower rates.  
Other taxes are under 2 percent on average, and do not vary significantly by income 
level.  However, they are as high as 17.6 percent in Bolivia and 14.5 percent in 
Argentina.  
The combined VAT and sales tax rate averages at 17 percent, and does not vary 
much across income groups.  It hits the low of zero in Hong Kong, and the high of 73.5 
percent in Brazil, although the second highest country is Hungary at 27.2 percent.  The 
highest personal income tax rate averages 33.5 percent in the world, and is sharply higher 
in the rich than in the middle income countries.  The rate is as high as 60 percent in 
Vietnam and 59 percent in Denmark, and as low as zero in Uruguay and 11.5 percent in 
Switzerland.   
  Our measures of tax administration for TaxpayerCo vary hugely by income level.  
The average annual number of all corporate tax payments is 35, ranging from 16 for high 
income countries to 48 for lower middle income countries, and 44 for poor countries.  
  18Norway has 3 tax payments a year, Hong Kong has 4, but Romania has 89 and the 
Ukraine 98.  Some of the higher number of payments is related to the greater number of 
“other taxes” and the absence of electronic payments.   
When it comes to the amount of time TaxpayerCo spends to comply with taxes, 
the world-wide average is 406 hours per year, but it varies from 229 hours for rich 
countries to 640 hours for lower middle income countries (and 425 hours for poor 
countries).  TaxpayerCo in Singapore would spend 30 hours a year complying with taxes; 
TaxpayerCo in Switzerland would spend 63.  The corresponding numbers are 2185 hours 
in the Ukraine and 2600 hours in Brazil.  Part of the burden of taxation in poorer 
countries clearly comes from administration, and not just rates
15. 
  Over 2003-2005, the world-wide average investment to GDP ratio is about 21 
percent, and is not substantially different across income groups.  There is significant 
variation across countries: investment to GDP ratio is above 30 percent in Jamaica, 
Mongolia, Vietnam, and of course China (40.8 percent).  In contrast, investment to GDP 
ratio is the lowest, at below 15 percent, in Uruguay, Bolivia, Malawi, and the Kyrgyz 
Republic.  Relatively little of that investment is FDI, although several authors consider 
FDI numbers to be more accurate than overall investment numbers.  The World Bank 
ratio of Foreign Direct Investment to GDP averages to 3.36 percent between 2003 and 
2005, and appears to be somewhat higher for the middle income than for the rich and the 
poor countries.  Ireland, Denmark, and Bolivia have the lowest FDI numbers, Lebanon, 
Singapore, and Hong Kong the highest.   
                                                 
15 The high correlation of our measures of tax compliance with per capita income and legal origins (see 
below) raises the concern that these measures reflect the quality of government more broadly rather than 
merely the costs of tax compliance (see La Porta et al. 1999).       
  19 Business  density  relative  to working-age population is a somewhat unusual 
measure of entrepreneurship, but might be a reasonable one.  The variable plausibly 
declines from 7.63 incorporated businesses per 100 workers for high income countries to 
1.08 for low income countries, which might reflect both fewer businesses at lower levels 
of development, and presumably fewer official businesses.  The data point to 0.004 
businesses per 100 workers in Burkina Faso, 0.04 in Senegal, but rising all the way to 15 
in Malaysia and 16 in Sweden.  The rise of business density with income is statistically 
significant.  This measure of entrepreneurship is available for 80 countries.     
Entry is defined as the number of newly registered limited liability corporations, 
as a percentage of the stock of such firms, for 62 countries (averaged over 2000-2004).  
The world-wide average entry rate is about 8.1 percent, and tends to be somewhat higher 
for the rich and upper middle income countries (8.8 percent and 9.1 percent, respectively) 
than for the lower middle income and poor countries (7.3 percent and 6.4 percent, 
respectively).  The difference in entry rates between the high and the low income 
countries is statistically significant.  The entry rates are as low as 2 percent in the 
Philippines, 3 percent in Peru, Sri Lanka, and Japan, and as high as 15 percent in 
Kazakhstan and 16 percent in New Zealand.  
In addition to the aggregate measures of investment and entrepreneurship, we also 
consider resource allocation within and between sectors, although in smaller samples.  
For both manufacturing and services, median investment to sales ratios in the Enterprise 
Survey sample are around 1 percent,  much lower than the aggregate Investment to GDP 
ratios.  As we indicated, this is in part because we have sufficient data only to estimate 
investment in new machinery, in part because public investment is excluded, and in part 
  20because Enterprise Surveys may exclude the largest firms.  Informal economies are huge, 
reaching around 35 percent in lower middle and low income countries.  Finally, ratios of 
debt to equity are much higher in the richer than in the poorer countries.      
Table 4 presents the same variables as Table 3, except it organizes them by legal 
origin of national commercial laws rather than per capita income.  In earlier work, legal 
origin has been found to be a strong predictor of national regulatory strategies, with civil 
law (particularly French civil law) countries providing less market-friendly regulation 
than common law countries (see La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008 
for an overview).  Here we check whether our variables vary significantly by legal origin.  
  There is no evidence that statutory corporate tax rates vary by legal origin, 
although there is some evidence that German legal origin countries (several of which are 
in East Asia and Eastern Europe) have lower 1
st year effective rates.  There is also weak 
evidence that, for the 5-year effective corporate tax rates, common law countries have 3 
percentage points higher rates, on average, than French civil law countries.  The labor tax 
is higher in civil law countries, although this might merely reflect the fact that these 
countries impose labor taxes on firms rather than individuals.   French legal origin 
countries also have higher levels of “other taxes,” although the difference is not 
statistically significant.  Civil law countries also have a higher rate of VAT and sales 
taxes than common law countries do.  Highest bracket personal income tax rates do not 
vary much by legal origin.   
For tax administration, French legal origin countries exhibit sharply higher 
numbers of tax payments and time to comply with taxes than other legal traditions 
(particularly common law).  This result is consistent with the finding of higher formalism 
  21and burden of government regulation in the French legal origin countries (Djankov et al. 
2002, 2003, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008).  There is not much 
difference in overall investment, FDI, or entrepreneurship rates among legal origins.   
Finally, there is some evidence that French civil law countries have larger informal 
economies than do common law ones. 
 
III. Results  
  We first show the basic relations between corporate taxes and investment and 
entrepreneurship, then check their robustness to controls and alternative specifications. 
   
A. Basic Results 
Table 5 presents our main findings; Figures 1-4 illustrate them.  We use the four 
measures of investment and entrepreneurship as dependent variables, and the three 
corporate tax rates as independent variables, for a total of 12 specifications.  In Table 5, 
we use no controls.   The results for the statutory tax rate are similar to those for effective 
rates in both the magnitude and the statistical significance (except for aggregate 
investment).  Also, the results for the 1
st year and 5-year effective corporate income tax 
rates are very similar (the two rates are correlated at 0.92).  As we indicated in the 
introduction, we do not believe that, given our data, we can distinguish the relative 
importance of marginal and effective tax rates.  For these reasons, we focus the results 
using the 1
st year effective tax rate even though the statutory rate is often significant.    
The results show no statistically significant effect of the statutory tax rate on 
investment but a large effect of that rate on FDI.  The effects of effective rates on both 
  22investment and FDI are statistically significant and large.  The estimates indicate that 
raising the 1
st year effective tax rate by 10 percentage points reduces the investment rate 
by 2.2 percentage points (average investment rate is 21.5 percent) and FDI rate by 2.3 
percentage points (average FDI rate is 3.36 percent)
16.   These results are comparable to 
those found in the literature.  According to a survey by Hassett and Hubbard (2002, p. 
1325), “[r]ecent empirical studies appear to have reached a consensus that the elasticity 
of investment with respect to the tax-adjusted user cost of capital is between -0.5 and -
1.0.”  At the mean of our tax and investment variables, the comparable elasticity using 
the 1
st year effective rate is -.835, very much in the Hassett-Hubbard range.   
The effects of taxes on our measures of entrepreneurship are large and statistically 
significant, and show up with both the statutory and the effective tax rates.  A 10 
percentage point increase in the 1
st year effective corporate tax rate reduces business 
density by 1.9 firms per 100 people (average is 5), and the average entry rate by 1.4 
percentage points (average is 8)
17.   
Before checking the robustness of these findings, we report the results of running 
these specifications with Hassett-Mathur (2006) data. The overlap of the two samples is 
64 observations.  The correlation of our 1
st year effective tax rate with their Effective 
Average Tax Rate (EATR) is 0.56, and with their Effective Marginal Tax Rate (EMTR) 
is 0.48. Both correlations are highly statistically significant. Neither of the two Hassett-
Mathur rates significantly predicts aggregate investment.  EMTR predicts FDI at the 10 
                                                 
16 We have confirmed these FDI results using data from the OECD (Web Appendix C). We also examined 
the effects of taxes on the aggregate capital labor ratio, updating Francesco Caselli and James Feyrer (2007) 
to 2003 and 2004. We did not find any significant results. We tried to build up new estimates of the capital 
labor ratio from the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey, but the Survey is much less suited for this than for 
investment.    
17 Some studies examine the effect of personal income taxes on entrepreneurial activity in the United 
States, and find significant effects. See, e.g., William M. Gentry and Hubbard (2000) and Julie Berry 
Cullen and Gordon (2007).  
  23percent significance level, and the coefficient is roughly half of that on our 1
st year 
effective tax rate.  The EATR (but not EMTR) is also a statistically significant predictor 
of the two entrepreneurship variables, with coefficients roughly two thirds of ours.   
Hassett-Mathur variables thus point in the same direction as ours, but not as strongly.  
  
B. Robustness 
The magnitude of the effects documented in Table 5 is large, and raises obvious 
questions about spuriousness.  In this subsection, we add a variety of variables to the 
specifications in Table 5 to verify whether the results are robust
18.  In our working paper, 
we added these controls individually, and many of them were significant predictors of 
entrepreneurship and investment.  Since we are largely interested in the robustness of 
corporate income tax results, however, here we add the controls in groups.   
In Table 5a, we add other tax variables, including “other taxes,” VAT and sales 
tax, and the highest national rate on personal income tax
19.  As Table 5a shows, “other 
taxes” enter significantly very occasionally, VAT and Sales Tax shows up significantly 
only in the FDI specifications, and Personal Income Tax has a positive effect on 
investment
20 and negative on FDI.  We do not read much in these findings, but note that, 
with all these controls, the coefficients on our tax variables maintain their magnitude and 
statistical significance throughout.   
In Table 5b, we include the logarithm of the number of tax payments, an indicator 
of tax evasion from the Global Competitiveness Report (with higher scores indicating 
                                                 
18 One observation that looks very influential in Figures 1-4 is Bolivia.  The results are robust to omitting it. 
19 We also tried the labor tax, which by itself never enters significantly or affects the coefficients on 
corporate tax variables.   
20 This result is a fluke caused by China and Vietnam, which have both very high personal tax rates and 
investment rates.  Without them, there is no relationship.   
  24less evasion), and the number of procedures to start a business from the Doing Business 
update of Djankov et al. (2002).  The logarithm of the number of tax payments has no 
effect on investment and FDI, but it is negatively related to both business density and 
entry.  Lower tax evasion is associated with more FDI, but not with more investment or 
entrepreneurial activity.  More procedures to start a business are marginally associated 
with lower business density, but are otherwise unrelated to our outcome measures.  But, 
again, the corporate tax rates remain consistently significant, and the magnitude of their 
coefficients falls only slightly with the simultaneous inclusion of all these controls.   
In Table 5c, we focus on institutional controls.  These include a property rights 
index from the Heritage Foundation, and indicators of rigidity of employment laws from 
Doing Business update of Botero et al. (2004), an index of a country’s openness to trade, 
and, as a catch-all residual proxy for institutional quality, lagged per capita income, 
which might also capture other sources of heterogeneity.  We do not find interesting 
results for the property rights index.  Rigid employment laws are negatively related to 
FDI, but not other outcomes.  Trade openness is strongly related to both investment and 
FDI, but not our measures of entrepreneurship.  Lagged per capita income is only related 
to business density.  Yet even with all these theoretically (though not empirically) 
powerful controls, the corporate income tax variables remain highly significant, and their 
coefficients have very similar values to original specifications.  
In Table 5d, we include all of the controls we already considered, but also two 
measures of inflation.  Inflation may have an adverse effect on investment, in part 
because depreciation deductions are not indexed in most countries (e.g., Auerbach and 
Jorgenson 1980, Summers 1981).  Moreover, countries that have difficulty collecting 
  25taxes might finance their budgets, including capital budgets, by printing money.  We 
include the average 1995-2004 inflation and 2004 seignorage as a measure of government 
reliance on the printing press
21.  We do not find any consistent results for inflation or for 
that matter for any other control variable in the kitchen sink regression of Table 5d.  With 
12 control variables we also lose the statistical significance of the coefficients on the 
corporate income tax variables, as their magnitudes fall by 1/3 to 1/2. 
So what is the bottom line of these robustness checks?  Most groups of control 
variables have not made much dent into the effects of corporate taxes, although the 
inclusion of all controls at once eliminates the significance of the results.  None of the 
controls appears to be as persistently important as do the tax rates.  Our empirical design 
can never entirely eliminate the concern that some other factor correlated with the 
corporate tax rate influences investment.  Corporate taxes have a substantial adverse 
effect on investment and entrepreneurship, and one that persists with a range of controls.  
 
C. Allocation 
In Table 6, we look at the influence of corporate taxes on different sectors, using 
the World Bank Enterprise Survey’s estimates of new machinery investment in 
manufacturing and services.  The samples now are much smaller, especially for services.  
The results show that 1
st and 5-year Effective Tax Rates have an adverse effect on 
investment in manufacturing but not in services.  Even with a very small sample, the 
                                                 
21 Our results remain statistically significant when either of the two inflation measures is included as the 
only extra control. As perhaps a more refined way to deal with inflation, we have computed the 5-year 
effective corporate tax rate allowing TaxpayerCo’s revenues and costs, but not depreciation deductions, to 
rise with inflation (regardless of whether the law allows for indexation of depreciation deductions). This 
inflation-adjusted 5-year effective corporate tax rate was correlated with the not inflation-adjusted one at 99 
percent. The results using this rate were virtually identical, and so are not reported. In this time of low 
world-wide inflation and this cross-country context, then, we do not find evidence that inflation has much 
influence on investment.   
  26coefficients for manufacturing are roughly half of what we obtained with aggregate data.  
This evidence is consistent with Davis and Henrekson (2005), who suggest that the 
relevant margin of distortion for services might be informality rather than reduction in 
formal investment.  Alternatively, we might just have bad data for investment in services.     
In the same spirit, we look at the effect of corporate taxes on the size of the 
informal economy, since one of the principal ways in which taxes might deter official 
entry or official investment is by keeping firms in the informal sector.  A 10 percentage 
point increase in the 1
st year effective tax rate raises the informal economy as a share of 
economic activity by nearly 2 percentage points.  This result is robust to the inclusion of 
the Global Competitiveness Report measure of tax evasion, suggesting that the tax rates, 
rather than tax administration more generally, influence informality
22.  Consistent with 
Simon Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997), Davis and Henrekson (2005), 
Schneider (2005), and La Porta and Shleifer (2008), taxes are an important reason firms 
stay unofficial.   
These results have important implications for our findings on the large adverse 
effects of corporate income taxation on investment and entrepreneurship.  The measures 
of investment, FDI, business density, and entry we use all reflect formal economic 
activity.  Corporate taxes might affect these measures either by reducing total activity or 
by keeping it informal.  The finding on the informal economy suggests that at least part 
of the adverse effect of taxes is to keep economic activity, such as investment and new 
business formation, informal, rather than to eliminate activity altogether.     
                                                 
22 The picture with other controls is more mixed. The coefficient on the 1
st Year Effective Tax rate remains 
significant if we control for the VAT and sales tax, the top marginal tax rate, the property rights index, 
employment rigidity, and inflation. It loses significance (without falling much in magnitude) if we control 
for the number of tax payments, the number of procedures to start a business, seignorage, and freedom to 
trade internationally.   
  27The impact of corporate taxes is not just that on informality, however.  Corporate 
taxes have a large adverse effect on FDI, virtually all of which is formal.  Also relevant is 
the adverse effect on manufacturing investment in the Enterprise Survey, which deals 
only with formal firms.  It seems likely, then, that corporate income taxation diminishes 
aggregate investment and entrepreneurship, and not only influences formality.      
In Table 7, we ask whether corporate taxes encourage debt finance, since interest 
payments are universally tax-deductible.  We control for the logarithm of 2003 GDP per 
capita, as well as the ratio of equity market capitalization to GDP.  The control variables 
suggest that firms in richer countries have higher debt to equity ratios, but that the size of 
the equity market does not matter.  Taxes, however, do.  A 10 percentage point increase 
in the 1
st year effective corporate tax rate raises the debt to equity ratio by highly 
statistically significant 40 percentage points (the mean is 111 percent).  In our data, 
countries with higher effective (as well as statutory) tax rates use sharply more debt.  This 
result is consistent with most theories of optimal capital structure (Graham 2003). 
  
IV. Conclusion   
This paper presents basic statistical relationships between corporate taxes, 
investment, and entrepreneurship using new data on effective 1
st year and 5-year 
corporate income tax rates for 85 countries.  We present cross-country evidence that 
effective corporate tax rates have a large and significant adverse effect on corporate 
investment and entrepreneurship.  This effect is robust if we control for other tax rates, 
including personal income taxes and the VAT and sales tax, for measures of 
administrative burdens, tax compliance, property rights protection, regulations, economic 
  28development, openness to foreign trade, seignorage, and inflation.  Higher effective 
corporate income taxes are also associated with lower investment in manufacturing but 
not in services, a larger unofficial economy, and greater reliance on debt as opposed to 
equity finance.  In these new data, corporate taxes matter a lot, and in ways consistent 
with basic economic theory.  
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  Table 1. Pre-tax financial statements
A - Information provided in the balance sheet
Assets
Category  Multiplication Factor  Values for the U.S. 
Net Cash 20 755,600
Inventory 35 1,322,300
Accounts Receivable 50 1,889,000
Land 30 1,133,400
Building 40 1,511,200
Machinery 60 2,266,800
Truck 5 188,900
Computers 5 188,900
Office Equipment 5 188,900
Total Assets 250 9,445,000
Liabilities
Category  Multiplication Factor  Values for the U.S. 
Short Term Debt 55 2,077,900
Accounts Payable – Trade 50 1,889,000
Long Term Debt 43 1,624,540
Equity
Category  Multiplication Factor  Values for the U.S. 
Paid-in Capital 102 3,853,560
Total Liabilities and Equity 250 9,445,000
B - Information provided in the profit and loss statement
Category Multiplication Factor  Values for the U.S. 
Sales 1050 39,699,000
Cost of Goods Sold 875 33,057,500
Managers  9 (= 2.25 per manager * 4) 340,020
Assistants  10 (= 1.25 per assistant * 8) 377,800
Workers  48 (= 1.00 per worker * 48) 1,813,440
Administrative expenses 10 377,800
Advertising Expenses 10.5 396,690
Machinery Repair Expenses 3 113,340
Interest Expense 5.5 207,790Table 2. Variable Definitions
Variable name Source Definition
Tax Variables
Statutory Corporate Tax Rate (%) Authors' calculations The tax rate for the highest bracket of all taxes on corporate income. We take 
into account the deductibility of any of these taxes from the tax based used for 
calculating pre-tax corporate income.
1st Year Effective Tax Rate (%) Authors' calculations The tax rate obtained by dividing the total corporate tax TaxpayerCo pays by its 
pretax earnings.
5-year Effective Tax Rate (%) Authors' calculations The tax rate obtained by dividing the present-discounted value of the total 
corporate tax TaxpayerCo pays over five years by the present-discounted value 
of the pretax earnings in these five years.
Labor Tax (%) Authors' calculations The sum of all labor-related taxes payable by TaxpayerCo, including payroll 
taxes, mandatory social security contributions, mandatory health insurance, 
mandatory unemployment insurance, worker's compensation insurance 
contributions, and any local contributions that are proportional to payroll or 
number of employees. It is expressed as a percentage of pretax earnings.
Other taxes (%) Authors' calculations The sum of all taxes payable TaxpayerCo other than corporate income taxes a
labor taxes where the statutory incidence is on the firm. It is the sum of all 
property tax, business license tax, financial transactions tax, turnover tax, and 
asett and capital tax payable by TaxpayerCo. It is expressed as a percentage of 
pretax earnings.
VAT and Sales tax Authors' calculations The sum of all consumption tax rates payable or collected by TaxpayerCo, 
including value added tax rate, sales tax rate, and turnover tax rate, and and 
related surtaxes.
PIT top marginal rate World Bank (World Development 
Indicators), PricewaterhouseCoopers, and 
IBFD
The tax rate for the highest bracket of tax on personal income. Only taxes at the 
national level are included.
Number of tax payments World Bank (Doing Business data) The tax payments indicator reflects the total number of taxes paid, the method 
payment, the frequency of payment, and the number of agencies involved for 
this standardized case during the second year of operation. It includes 
payments made by the company on consumption taxes, such as sales tax or 
value added tax.
Time to comply with taxes (in hours) World Bank (Doing Business data) Time is recorded in hours per year. The indicator measures the time to prepare, 
file and pay (or withhold) three major types of taxes: the corporate income tax, 
value added or sales tax, and labor taxes, including payroll taxes and social 
security contributions.
Outcome variables
Investment 2003-2005 as % of GDP World Bank (World Development 
Indicators) 
Gross fixed capital formation (formerly gross domestic fixed investment)
FDI 2003-2005 as % of GDP World Bank (World Development 
Indicators) 
Foreign direct investment is the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting 
management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise 
operating in an economy other than that of the investor.
FDI 2002-2004 as % of GDP  OECD (International Direct Investment 
Statistics)
The Foreign direct investment measured by the OECD is the sum of the direct 
investment by all countries made in each OECD member country receiving the 
investment (as published in the international direct investment statitics). The 
authors then measured this sum as a percentage of the total GDP in the 
receiving country. (Total GDP is published by the World Bank (World 
Development Indicators).) For each country, these percentages were averaged 
over the years 2002 to 2004.
Business density per 100 people 
(2003/2004)
Authors' data, collected from business 
registries
The number of limited liability corporations (or their country-specific equivalent) 
legally registered divided by the working-age population (total population aged 
to 64). Only businesses with at least one employee that are not 
soleproprietorships are included. The variable is scaled to measure the number 
of businesses per 100 people in the working-age population.
Average entry rate 2000-2004 (%)  Authors' data, collected from business 
registries
The average number of limited liability corporations (or their country-specific 
equivalent) that were registered per year between 2000 and 2004. Only 
businesses with more than one employee that are not soleproprietorships are 
included. The variable is scaled to measure the number of businesses per 100 
people in the working-age population.
Median manufacturing sector firm 
investment
World Bank (Enterprise Surveys) The country median of the firm level investments in new machinery and 
equipment as a percentage of total sales of the firm.Table 2. Variable Definitions
Median service sector firm investmentWorld Bank (Enterprise Surveys) The country median of the firm level investments in new machinery and 
equipment as a percentage of total sales of the firm.
Size of the informal sector 2005-2007World Economic Forum (Global 
Competitiveness Report 2005-2006 and 
2006-2007)
Average of the size of the informal sector as a percentage of economic activity
2005-2006 and 2006-2007. Computed using the scale provided in sections 6.1
(2005-2006) and 6.30 (2006-2007), which report measures on informal sector 
activity.
Debt to equity ratio IMF (International Financial Statistics 
Database)
Average of the country's companies' debt (book value) as a percentage of 
companies' equity (book value) weighted by the companies' market caps. This 
ratio is computed using the IMF's Corporate Vulnerability Utility which uses firm 
level data from Datastream and Worldscope.
Control variables
Tax evasion World Economic Forum (Global 
Competitiveness Report 2001-2002)
Executives' assessment of how important tax evasion is in their country (the 
lower the measure the more rampant is tax evasion). Based on table 6.11.
GDP per capita 2003 World Bank (World Development 
Indicators)
GDP per cpaita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. Data 
are in constant U.S. dollars.
IEF Property Rights Index The Heritage Foundation (Index of 
Economic Freedom)
The property rights index is an assessment of the ability of individuals to 
accumulate private property, secured by clear laws that are fully enforced by the 
state.
Procedures to start a business World Bank (Doing Business data) 
Updates of Djankov  et al. (2002)
This variable includes all procedures that are officially required for an 
entrepreneur to start up and formally operate an industrial or commercial 
business.
Employment rigidity index World Bank (Doing Business data) 
Updates of Botero  et al. (2004)
The average of three subindices: a difficulty of hiring index, a rigidity of hours 
index, and a difficulty of firing index.
Average inflation 1995-2004 World Bank (World Development 
Indicators)
Inflation as measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator 
shows the rate of price change in the economy as a whole, averaged over the 
period 1995-2004. The GDP implicit deflator is the ratio of GDP in current local 
currency to GDP in constant local currency. World Bank national accounts data 
and OECD national accounts data files.
Seignorage IMF (International Financial Statistics 
Database)
Currency in circulation outside banks as percentage of total GDP. The data on 
currency comes from IFS line 14 A.
EFW Freedom to Trade Inter-
nationally Index
The Fraser Institute (Economic Freedom o
the World)
This index measures taxes on international trade, regulatory trade barriers, size 
of the trade sector relative to expected, black-market exchange rates, and 
international capital market controls.
Equity Market Cap in % of GDP 2003 IMF  Market capitalization is the share price times the number of shares outstanding. 
Listed domestic companies are the domestically incorporated companies listed 
on the country's stock exchanges at the end of the year. Listed companies do 
not include investment companies, mutual funds, or other collective investment 
vehicles. The ratio is computed by the IMF's Corporate Vulnerability Unit which 
uses data from Standard and Poor's Emerging Stock Markets Factbook and 
supplemental S&P data, and World Bank and OECD GDP estimates.
Other variables
Income group World Bank (World Development 
Indicators)
Economies are divided according to 2004 GNI per capita, calculated using the 
World Bank Atlas method. The groups are: low income, $905 or less; lower 
middle income, $906 - $3,595; upper middle income, $3,596 - $11,115; and 
high income, $11,116 or more.
Legal origin La Porta et al. (2008) A dummy variable that identifies the legal origin of the Company law or 
Commercial Code of each country. The four origins are English, French, 
German, and Nordic.Table 3. Averages by income group
Corporate tax rates
T-test T-test T-test
High income
Upper middle 
income
High vs. Upper 
middle income
Lower middle 
income
High vs. Lower 
middle income Low income
High vs. Low 
income Grand Total
Obs. 27 19 21 18 85
Statutory Corporate Tax Rate 30.63 24.48 2,897*** 28.69 0.982 31.86 -0.651 29.04
1st Year Effective Tax Rate 18.08 13.53 2,421** 18.99 -0.481 18.79 -0.366 17.44
5-year Effective Tax Rate 20.49 15.39 3,003*** 20.16 0.185 21.57 -0.636 19.50
Other tax rates
T-test T-test T-test
High income
Upper middle 
income
High vs. Upper 
middle income
Lower middle 
income
High vs. Lower 
middle income Low income
High vs. Low 
income Grand Total
Labor Tax   [Total obs.: 85] 14.67 18.05 -1.122 16.73 -0.710 10.69 1.479 15.09
Other Taxes   [Total obs.: 85] 1.02 2.18 -1.545 2.20 -1.525 1.69 -1.397 1.71
VAT and Sales tax   [Total obs.: 85] 15.56 17.91 -1.234 18.46 -0.982 16.98 -0.753 17.10
PIT top marginal rate   [Total obs.: 85] 38.51 30.79 2,178** 28.45 3,197*** 34.72 1.096 33.50
Tax administration
T-test T-test T-test
High income
Upper middle 
income
High vs. Upper 
middle income
Lower middle 
income
High vs. Lower 
middle income Low income
High vs. Low 
income Grand Total
Number of tax payments   [Total obs.: 85] 16 38 -4,625*** 48 -6,926*** 44 -6,911*** 35
Time to comply with taxes (in hours)   [Total obs.: 85] 229 378 -2,275** 640 -3,063*** 425 -2,526** 406
Investment and entrepreneurship
T-test T-test T-test
High income
Upper middle 
income
High vs. Upper 
middle income
Lower middle 
income
High vs. Lower 
middle income Low income
High vs. Low 
income Grand Total
Investment 2003-2005 as % of GDP   [Total obs.: 85] 21.14 20.55 0.526 22.49 -1.005 21.67 -0.394 21.46
FDI 2003-2005 as % of GDP   [Total obs.: 84] 3.03 3.94 -0.842 4.02 -0.927 2.45 0.527 3.36
Business density per 100 people (2003/04)   [Total obs.: 80] 7.63 6.35 1.231 3.02 4,817*** 1.08 6,813*** 5.05
Average entry rate (%) 2000-2004   [Total obs.: 62] 8.79 9.09 -0.281 7.34 1.279 6.41 2,141** 8.11
Other dependent variables
T-test T-test T-test
High income
Upper middle 
income
High vs. Upper 
middle income
Lower middle 
income
High vs. Lower 
middle income Low income
High vs. Low 
income Grand Total
Size of the informal sector 2005-07   [Total obs.: 83] 18.02 27.36 -5,062*** 32.26 -9,146*** 35.78 -11,742*** 27.29
Debt to equity ratio   [Total obs.: 51] 147.00 73.74 2,869*** 81.50 2,422** 58.07 1,833* 111.69
Manufacturing Investment (Median)   [Total obs.: 31] -- 1.75 -- 0.82 -- 0.97 -- 1.11
Service Investment (Median)   [Total obs.: 20] -- 0.97 -- 0.68 -- 1.68 -- 1.08
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%Table 4. Averages by legal origin
Corporate tax rates
T-test
Legal Origin English French German Nordic Grand Total English vs. French
Obs. 24 40 17 4 85
Statutory Corporate Tax Rate 30.99 29.35 25.62 28.75 29.04 0.962
1st Year Effective Tax Rate 18.68 18.76 12.72 16.80 17.44 -0.045
5-year Effective Tax Rate 22.45 19.69 14.85 19.66 19.50 1,891*
Other tax rates
T-test
Legal Origin English French German Nordic Grand Total Obs. English vs. French
Labor Tax 7.43 17.83 19.62 14.44 15.09 85 -5,356***
Other Taxes 1.55 2.25 0.95 0.55 1.71 85 -0.881
VAT and Sales tax 13.83 18.52 16.78 24.00 17.10 85 -2,101**
PIT top marginal rate 33.54 32.74 35.44 32.55 33.50 85 0.284
Tax administration
T-test
Legal Origin English French German Nordic Grand Total Obs. English vs. French
Number of tax payments 30.92 41.63 30.18 11.25 34.88 85 -1,809*
Time to comply with taxes (in hours) 281.96 505.80 403.88 152.00 405.56 85 -1,984*
Investment and entrepreneurship
T-test
Legal Origin English French German Nordic Grand Total Obs. English vs. French
Investment 2003-2005 as % of GDP 21.18 20.45 24.96 18.30 21.46 85 0.681
FDI 2003-2005 as % of GDP 3.15 3.50 3.91 1.03 3.36 84 -0.417
Business density per 100 people (2003/04) 5.35 3.73 6.80 8.96 5.05 80 1.597
Average entry rate (%) 2000-2004 8.50 7.51 8.07 9.92 8.11 62 0.952
Other dependent variables
T-test
Legal Origin English French German Nordic Grand Total Obs. English vs. French
Size of the informal sector 2005-07 26.70 30.54 23.55 15.83 27.29 83 -1,666*
Debt to equity ratio 97.14 130.83 109.97 75.66 111.69 51 -1.318
Manufacturing Investment (Median) 0.82 0.98 3.86 -- 1.11 31 -0.276
Service Investment (Median) 1.77 0.71 0.68 -- 1.08 20 1.182
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%Table 5
Panel A - Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Investment 2003-2005 FDI 2003-2005
Statutory Corporate Tax Rate -0.072 -0.195***
(0.076) (0.046)
1st Year Effective Tax Rate -0.217*** -0.226***
(0.074) (0.045)
5-Year Effective Tax Rate -0.247*** -0.223***
(0.080) (0.050)
Constant 23.547*** 25.239*** 26.269*** 9.044*** 7.292*** 7.718***
(2.274) (1.385) (1.627) (1.378) (0.845) (1.023)
Observations 85 85 85 84 84 84
R-squared 0.01 0.09 0.10 0.18 0.23 0.20
Panel B - Entrepreneurship
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Business Density Average entry rate 2000-2004
Statutory Corporate Tax Rate -0.153** -0.127**
(0.063) (0.060)
1st Year Effective Tax Rate -0.193*** -0.137**
(0.062) (0.057)
5-Year Effective Tax Rate -0.200*** -0.136**
(0.068) (0.061)
Constant 9.473*** 8.394*** 8.913*** 11.812*** 10.452*** 10.771***
(1.864) (1.162) (1.375) (1.790) (1.048) (1.262)
Observations 80 80 80 62 62 62
R-squared 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.08
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%Table 5a.
Panel A - Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Investment 2003-2005 FDI 2003-2005
Statutory Corporate Tax Rate -0.089 -0.166***
(0.077) (0.048)
1st Year Effective Tax Rate -0.202** -0.225***
(0.079) (0.048)
5-Year Effective Tax Rate -0.248*** -0.238***
(0.085) (0.053)
Controls:
Other Taxes -0.413** -0.255 -0.232 -0.127 0.019 0.012
(0.183) (0.190) (0.188) (0.113) (0.115) (0.116)
VAT and Sales Tax -0.068 -0.084 -0.104* -0.064* -0.079** -0.097***
(0.060) (0.058) (0.059) (0.038) (0.036) (0.037)
PIT top marginal rate 0.087* 0.090** 0.090** -0.047 -0.056** -0.059**
(0.046) (0.043) (0.043) (0.029) (0.026) (0.027)
Constant 22.981*** 23.823*** 25.442*** 11.078*** 10.488*** 11.621***
(2.545) (2.126) (2.352) (1.588) (1.294) (1.464)
Observations 85 85 85 84 84 84
R-squared 0.14 0.19 0.21 0.24 0.32 0.31
Panel B - Entrepreneurship
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Business Density Average entry rate 2000-2004
Statutory Corporate Tax Rate -0.141** -0.146**
(0.067) (0.069)
1st Year Effective Tax Rate -0.163** -0.149**
(0.070) (0.066)
5-Year Effective Tax Rate -0.171** -0.158**
(0.076) (0.073)
Controls:
Other Taxes -0.306* -0.205 -0.214 -0.071 0.031 0.026
(0.160) (0.171) (0.171) (0.141) (0.154) (0.154)
VAT and Sales Tax -0.003 -0.016 -0.027 -0.065 -0.049 -0.073
(0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.077) (0.075) (0.078)
PIT top marginal rate 0.010 -0.000 -0.004 0.023 0.010 0.007
(0.041) (0.039) (0.039) (0.045) (0.043) (0.042)
Constant 9.350*** 8.481*** 9.303*** 12.792*** 11.057*** 12.105***
(2.172) (1.869) (2.094) (2.361) (1.866) (2.133)
Observations 80 80 80 62 62 62
R-squared 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.09 0.10 0.09
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%Table 5b.
Panel A - Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Investment 2003-2005 FDI 2003-2005
Statutory Corporate Tax Rate -0.075 -0.177***
(0.092) (0.055)
1st Year Effective Tax Rate -0.179* -0.209***
(0.093) (0.056)
5-Year Effective Tax Rate -0.224** -0.197***
(0.098) (0.061)
Controls:
Log of number of tax payments 0.634 0.813 0.828 0.351 0.511 0.456
(0.947) (0.929) (0.916) (0.568) (0.557) (0.570)
Tax evasion (GCR) 0.586 0.590 0.736 1.014** 0.986** 1.108**
(0.741) (0.723) (0.717) (0.444) (0.432) (0.446)
Procedures to start a business 0.082 0.102 0.090 0.083 0.090 0.071
(0.213) (0.208) (0.205) (0.128) (0.124) (0.127)
Constant 18.693*** 18.907*** 19.665*** 2.958 1.041 1.144
(5.755) (5.291) (5.262) (3.452) (3.165) (3.269)
Observations 63 63 63 62 62 62
R-squared 0.02 0.07 0.09 0.22 0.26 0.22
Panel B - Entrepreneurship
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Business Density Average entry rate 2000-2004
Statutory Corporate Tax Rate -0.057 -0.126**
(0.065) (0.059)
1st Year Effective Tax Rate -0.125* -0.110*
(0.067) (0.060)
5-Year Effective Tax Rate -0.134* -0.137**
(0.070) (0.063)
Controls:
Log of number of tax payments -1.139* -1.006 -1.030 -1.243** -1.269** -1.269**
(0.677) (0.667) (0.664) (0.598) (0.605) (0.596)
Tax evasion (GCR) 0.337 0.333 0.423 0.056 -0.064 0.041
(0.529) (0.516) (0.519) (0.481) (0.482) (0.479)
Procedures to start a business -0.267* -0.255* -0.264* -0.164 -0.172 -0.170
(0.152) (0.148) (0.148) (0.145) (0.147) (0.145)
Constant 11.983*** 12.019*** 12.265*** 16.962*** 15.749*** 16.146***
(4.098) (3.775) (3.798) (3.600) (3.511) (3.480)
Observations 62 62 62 51 51 51
R-squared 0.26 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.29
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%Table 5c.
Panel A - Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Investment 2003-2005 FDI 2003-2005
Statutory Corporate Tax Rate 0.003 -0.110**
(0.088) (0.051)
1st Year Effective Tax Rate -0.198** -0.172***
(0.079) (0.045)
5-Year Effective Tax Rate -0.254*** -0.175***
(0.090) (0.053)
Controls:
IEF Property Rights Index -0.072* -0.060 -0.053 -0.053** -0.055** -0.052**
(0.043) (0.040) (0.040) (0.025) (0.023) (0.024)
Rigidity of employment -0.030 -0.035 -0.051 -0.042** -0.044** -0.054***
(0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020)
EFW Freedom to Trade Internationally Index 2.291** 1.543* 1.224 1.418*** 1.317*** 1.230**
(0.922) (0.835) (0.858) (0.536) (0.477) (0.505)
Log GDP pc 2003 -0.483 -0.398 -0.395 0.016 0.034 0.021
(0.536) (0.515) (0.509) (0.311) (0.293) (0.299)
Constant 14.129** 21.833*** 25.812*** 0.649 1.224 2.593
(7.024) (5.737) (6.311) (4.086) (3.297) (3.735)
Observations 81 81 81 80 80 80
R-squared 0.12 0.19 0.21 0.27 0.35 0.33
Panel B - Entrepreneurship
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Business Density Average entry rate 2000-2004
Statutory Corporate Tax Rate -0.112* -0.128**
(0.065) (0.062)
1st Year Effective Tax Rate -0.136** -0.123**
(0.060) (0.056)
5-Year Effective Tax Rate -0.161** -0.140**
(0.068) (0.063)
Controls:
IEF Property Rights Index 0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.020 0.009 0.015
(0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033)
Rigidity of employment -0.003 -0.004 -0.014 -0.020 -0.019 -0.028
(0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026)
EFW Freedom to Trade Internationally Index 1.126 1.107 0.936 0.663 0.819 0.681
(0.812) (0.752) (0.780) (0.642) (0.602) (0.626)
Log GDP pc 2003 1.024** 1.045** 1.040** -0.008 0.039 -0.002
(0.432) (0.424) (0.422) (0.438) (0.437) (0.435)
Constant -8.291 -8.871* -6.706 6.600 3.997 6.014
(6.012) (5.127) (5.626) (4.988) (4.165) (4.649)
Observations 76 76 76 60 60 60
R-squared 0.40 0.41 0.42 0.24 0.24 0.25
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%Table 5d.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Statutory Corporate Tax Rate -0.064 -0.030
(0.098) (0.066)
1st Year Effective Tax Rate -0.117 -0.100
(0.106) (0.071)
5-Year Effective Tax Rate -0.189 -0.095
(0.118) (0.081)
Controls:
Other Taxes -0.527*** -0.450** -0.396* -0.065 0.003 0.001
(0.188) (0.201) (0.203) (0.127) (0.134) (0.138)
VAT and Sales Tax 0.034 0.018 -0.002 0.003 -0.013 -0.016
(0.065) (0.067) (0.068) (0.044) (0.045) (0.047)
PIT top marginal rate 0.139*** 0.144*** 0.144*** -0.047 -0.038 -0.044
(0.050) (0.049) (0.047) (0.034) (0.033) (0.032)
Log of number of tax payments -0.024 0.149 0.185 -0.185 0.020 -0.074
(0.987) (0.998) (0.968) (0.667) (0.667) (0.660)
Log GDP pc 2003 -0.052 -0.258 -0.221 0.201 0.069 0.121
(0.900) (0.880) (0.865) (0.608) (0.588) (0.590)
IEF Property Rights Index -0.124* -0.110 -0.101 -0.084* -0.068 -0.071
(0.064) (0.066) (0.065) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044)
Procedures to start a business -0.004 0.028 0.043 0.040 0.083 0.065
(0.222) (0.222) (0.217) (0.150) (0.148) (0.148)
Rigidity of employment -0.083** -0.081** -0.091** -0.036 -0.037 -0.040
(0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027)
EFW Freedom to Trade Internationally Index 0.767 0.723 0.397 2.218*** 2.064*** 2.019***
(0.976) (0.916) (0.947) (0.659) (0.612) (0.645)
Seignorage 2004 0.384** 0.336** 0.319* 0.037 -0.007 0.003
(0.158) (0.164) (0.160) (0.106) (0.109) (0.109)
Average inflation (1995-2004) -0.066** -0.070** -0.074** 0.049** 0.043** 0.044**
(0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Tax evasion (GCR) 0.301 0.297 0.299 1.040* 1.002* 1.036*
(0.798) (0.785) (0.772) (0.539) (0.525) (0.526)
Constant 21.441** 22.301** 25.963** -10.302 -8.776 -7.938
(10.537) (10.344) (10.685) (7.115) (6.911) (7.283)
Observations 61 61 61 61 61 61
R-squared 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.46 0.48 0.47
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Statutory Corporate Tax Rate -0.034 -0.029
(0.083) (0.086)
1st Year Effective Tax Rate -0.068 -0.083
(0.092) (0.094)
5-Year Effective Tax Rate -0.070 -0.133
(0.103) (0.103)
Controls:
Other Taxes -0.312* -0.263 -0.262 0.012 0.083 0.124
(0.156) (0.171) (0.175) (0.155) (0.175) (0.176)
VAT and Sales Tax 0.025 0.015 0.012 0.065 0.043 0.022
(0.054) (0.056) (0.058) (0.102) (0.104) (0.105)
PIT top marginal rate -0.053 -0.048 -0.052 0.006 0.016 0.016
(0.043) (0.043) (0.041) (0.054) (0.054) (0.052)
Log of number of tax payments -0.362 -0.269 -0.319 -2.146** -1.978** -1.940**
(0.811) (0.821) (0.810) (0.845) (0.850) (0.823)
Log GDP pc 2003 1.833** 1.711** 1.747** -0.402 -0.534 -0.551
(0.737) (0.727) (0.724) (0.795) (0.794) (0.782)
IEF Property Rights Index -0.045 -0.035 -0.038 -0.062 -0.041 -0.029
(0.054) (0.056) (0.055) (0.062) (0.066) (0.065)
Procedures to start a business -0.100 -0.081 -0.090 -0.179 -0.118 -0.101
(0.182) (0.182) (0.181) (0.223) (0.231) (0.222)
Rigidity of employment -0.019 -0.019 -0.021 -0.012 -0.010 -0.015
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
EFW Freedom to Trade Internationally Index 1.645 1.530 1.506 1.410* 1.337* 1.126
(1.002) (0.968) (1.008) (0.809) (0.742) (0.767)
Seignorage 2004 -0.087 -0.115 -0.110 -0.191 -0.252 -0.265
(0.129) (0.135) (0.134) (0.170) (0.183) (0.177)
Average inflation (1995-2004) -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 0.026 0.026 0.025
(0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
Tax evasion (GCR) -0.627 -0.624 -0.606 0.530 0.459 0.448
(0.655) (0.648) (0.647) (0.715) (0.712) (0.699)
Constant -11.506 -10.350 -9.787 12.254 12.683 15.192*
(9.694) (9.666) (10.169) (8.268) (7.921) (8.239)
Observations 60 60 60 50 50 50
R-squared 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.41 0.42 0.44
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Business Density Average entry rate 2000-2004
Panel A - Investment
Investment 2003-2005 FDI 2003-2005
Panel B - EntrepreneurshipTable 6. Other outcomes
* *
* *
Panel A - Purchases of New Machinery and Equipment as % of Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Manufacturing Sector Service Sector
Statutory Corporate Tax Rate -0.012 0.081
(0.062) (0.066)
1st Year Effective Tax Rate -0.118** -0.054
(0.044) (0.071)
5-Year Effective Tax Rate -0.125** -0.013
(0.051) (0.074)
Constant 1.470 3.458*** 3.806*** -1.423 2.230 1.367
(1.945) (0.925) (1.146) (2.089) (1.559) (1.745)
Observations 31 31 31 20 20 20
R-squared 0.00 0.20 0.17 0.08 0.03 0.00
Panel B - Size of the Informal Sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Size of the Informal Sector
Statutory Corporate Tax Rate 0.166* 0.087
(0.089) (0.090)
1st Year Effective Tax Rate 0.184** 0.193**
(0.089) (0.091)
5-Year Effective Tax Rate 0.184* 0.271***
(0.097) (0.095)
Controls:
Log GDP pc 2003 -4.405*** -4.372*** -4.381***
(0.372) (0.371) (0.372)
Tax evasion (GCR) -6.286** -6.168** -6.342***
(0.543) (0.532) (0.513)
Constant 58.090*** 59.465*** 59.155*** 44.062** 42.802** 41.510***
(4.045) (3.500) (3.673) (3.342) (2.651) (2.588)
Observations 83 83 83 64 64 64
R-squared 0.64 0.65 0.64 0.69 0.71 0.72
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%Table 7. Debt-to-Equity Ratio
(1) (2) (3)
Statutory Corporate Tax Rate 4.205***
(1.469)
1st Year Effective Tax Rate 3.912**
(1.630)
5-Year Effective Tax Rate 2.674
(1.715)
Controls:
Equity Market Cap in % of GDP 2003 -0.183 -0.194 -0.318*
(0.183) (0.189) (0.184)
Log GDP pc 2003 28.360*** 29.618*** 30.510***
(8.104) (8.253) (8.517)
Constant -257.278***-209.359***-192.678**
(78.153) (74.165) (77.768)
Observations 50 50 50
R-squared 0.34 0.31 0.26
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Debt-to-Equity Ratio
Note that we exclude Zimbabwe from this sample as the size of the equity 
market seems to be blown up due to inflation. When we include Zimbabwe, 
our results get stronger.Figure 1 
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 Appendix 
 
Using the example of Argentina, the following is a description of how we obtained the tax 
measures “1
st Year Effective Corporate Tax Rate” and “5-Year Effective Corporate Tax Rate”.  
 
The statutory corporate income tax rate in Argentina is a single rate of 35%. The Social Security 
Contributions paid by the employer are 23% total. The tax base for the Social Security 
Contributions is the employee’s gross salary with a ceiling (which is not binding for 
TaxpayerCo.) The Social Security Contributions are deductible from the tax base for the 
corporate income tax. Depreciation rates are as follows: Land – not depreciable; Building – 2% 
straight-line; Machinery – 10% straight-line; Truck – 20% straight-line; Computers – 33.33% 
straight-line; Office Equipment – 20% straight-line. Advertising, interest, and machinery repair 
expenses are deductible in the tax base for the corporate income tax.  
 
We calculate the Labor Tax liability of TaxpayerCo as shown in Table A: 
 
Table A – Labor Tax Calculations 
 
Managers:      
Total annual salaries for the 4 managers  9*GNI per capita =  95,808
Monthly salaries  95,808/(12*4) =  1,996
Monthly Soc. Sec. Contr.  23%*1,996 =  459
Yearly Soc. Sec. Contr. per manager  12*459 =  5,509
Total annual Soc. Sec. Contr. for the 4 managers  4*5,509 =  22,036
    
Assistants:      
Total annual salaries for the 8 assistants  10*GNI per capita =  106,453
Monthly salaries  106,453/(12*8) =  1,109
Monthly Soc. Sec. Contr.  23%*1,109 =  255
Yearly Soc. Sec. Contr. per manager  12*255 =  3,061
Total annual Soc. Sec. Contr. for the 8 assistants  8*3,061 =  24,484
    
Workers:      
Total annual salaries for the 48 workers  48*GNI per capita =  510,975
Monthly salaries  510,975/(12*48) =  887
Monthly Soc. Sec. Contr.  23%*887 =  204
Yearly Soc. Sec. Contr. per manager  12*204 =  2,448
Total annual Soc. Sec. Contr. for the 48 workers  48*2,448 =  117,524
    
Total annual Social Security Contributions paid by TaxpayerCo.    164,044
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The depreciation allowances for the first five years are calculated as shown in Table B: 
 
 
Table B – Calculation of Depreciation Allowances 
 
  Year 1  Year 2  Year 3  Year 4  Year 5 
Building (40*GNI per capita)  425,812  417,296  408,780   400,264   391,747 
   Annual Depreciation (2% straight line)  8,516   8,516  8,516   8,516   8,516 
   Net Property  417,296  408,780  400,264   391,747   383,231 
Machinery (60*GNI per capita)  638,719  574,847  510,975   447,103   383,231 
   Annual Depreciation (10% straight line)  63,872  63,872  63,872   63,872   63,872 
   Net Machinery  574,847  510,975  447,103   383,231   319,359 
Truck (5*GNI per capita)  53,227  42,581  31,936   21,291   10,645 
   Annual Depreciation (20% straight line)  10,645  10,645  10,645   10,645   10,645 
   Net Machinery  42,581  31,936  21,291   10,645                -  
Computers (5*GNI per capita)  53,227  35,484  17,742                -                -  
   Annual Depreciation (33.33% straight line) 17,742  17,742 17,742     
   Net Machinery  35,484  17,742               -       
Office Equipment (5*GNI per capita)  53,227  42,581  31,936   21,291   10,645 
   Annual Depreciation (20% straight line)  10,645  10,645  10,645   10,645   10,645 
   Net Machinery  42,581  31,936  21,291   10,645                -  
Total Depreciation Allowance  111,421  111,421  111,421   93,679   93,679 
 
 
The Labor Tax liability, which as stated above is deductible in the Corporate Income Tax base, 
and the Depreciation Allowance are then used in the calculation of the Corporate Income Tax 
liability, which we calculate as shown in Table C: 
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Table C – Income Statement 
 
  Year 1  Year 2  Year 3  Year 4  Year 5 
Sales (=1050*GNI p.c.)  11,177,578  11,177,578 11,177,578 11,177,578    11,177,578 
Cost of Goods Sold (=875*GNI p.c.)  9,314,648 9,314,648 9,314,648 9,314,648    9,314,648 
Operating Expenses  (=77*GNI p.c.)  819,689 819,689 819,689 819,689    819,689 
Labor Taxes (as calculated above)  164,044 164,044 164,044 164,044    164,044 
Other Possible Deductions (i.e. 
advertising expenses at 10.5 GNI p.c. and 
machinery repair expenses at 4*GNI p.c.) 
143,712 143,712 143,712 143,712    143,712 
EBITDA  735,485  735,485  735,485  735,485   735,485 
Depreciation and Amortization (as 
calculated above)  111,421 111,421 111,421  93,679    93,679 
EBIT  624,064  624,064  624,064  641,806   641,806 
Interest Expense (=5.5*GNI p.c.)  58,549 58,549 58,549 58,549    58,549 
Earnings before Taxes   565,514  565,514  565,514  583,257   583,257 
Income  Tax  197,930 197,930 197,930 204,140    204,140 
Net  Income  367,584 367,584 367,584 379,117    379,117 
PDV of Income Tax (at an 8% 
discount rate)    197,930      183,269       169,693       162,053        150,049 
 
 
With this information the 1
st year effective corporate tax rate and the 5-year effective corporate 
tax rate are calculated as follows:  
-  The 1
st year effective corporate tax rate is simply the Year 1 income tax liability divided 
by the denominator (i.e. 79 times GNI per capita), which in Argentina’s case works out to 
be (197,930/840,980 =) 23.54%.  
-  The 5-year effective corporate tax rate is simply the sum of the present-discounted values 
of the income tax liability in years 1 to 5 divided by sum of the present-discounted values 
of the denominator in years 1 to 5 (which does not change in absolute terms but does 
change in PDV terms). In Argentina’s case, this works out to be (862,993/3,626,411 =) 
23.80%. 
 